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Abstract
We develop a coordination game to model interactions between
fundamentals and liquidity during unstable periods in ﬁnancial mar-
kets. We then propose a ﬂexible econometric framework for estimation
of the model and analysis of its quantitative implications. The speciﬁc
empirical application is carry trades in the yen–dollar market, includ-
ing the turmoil of 1998. We ﬁnd a generally very deep market, with
low information disparities amongst agents. We observe occasionally
episodes of market fragility, or turmoil with up by the escalator, down
by the elevator patterns in prices. The key role of strategic behavior
in the econometric model is also conﬁrmed.
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11 Introduction
Market participants’ strategic behavior has the potential to fuel and magnify
market turmoil and even trigger ﬁnancial crises. To capture and understand
such pathologies, we propose a global game theoretic model along with a ﬂex-
ible econometric framework for direct estimation using only publicly available
data.
As we link global games and empirical ﬁnance, our contribution is twofold.
First, from an empirical ﬁnance perspective, we develop a model with eco-
nomically meaningful parameters that decomposes returns into fundamental
and liquidity returns. Such a model can provide guidance for policy making
and risk management. Second, from a global games perspective, we develop
an econometric framework for estimation, analysis of quantitative implica-
tions and testing of data ﬁt. Our empirical analysis indicates that global
games are a sensible equilibria reﬁnement.
Our speciﬁc empirical focus is on currency carry trades, i.e. the exploitation
of violations of uncovered interest parity by buying high interest rate cur-
rencies and selling low interest rate currencies. In aggregate, the volume of
carry trades can be signiﬁcant, destabilizing currency markets. In a typical
situation, a slow buildup of positions is followed by rapid unwinding once
those positions are no longer so attractive. Therefore, the high interest rate
currency rises slowly but then crashes suddenly, following what has been
described as going up by the escalator – down by the elevator. While carry
trades are most common in currency markets, they are also prevalent in mar-
kets such as ﬁxed income and have been a prominent feature of the current
global ﬁnancial crisis.
Since the trading decisions of agents reinforce each other during such turbu-
lent episodes, they are naturally modelled by coordination games theory such
as the global games1 which provide our theoretic background. Most extant
attempts of applying coordination games to ﬁnancial data have focused on
currency crises, assuming common knowledge of economic fundamentals in
the spirit of models such as Obstfeld (1986). Common knowledge generally
implies multiple equilibria and sunspots, as in the Markov–switching model
of Jeanne and Masson (2000). In the absence of ad–hoc assumptions, multi-
ple equilibria frustrates empirical implementations. However, by making the
plausible assumption of asymmetric information, global games ﬁnd a unique
equilibrium.2
1See e.g. Morris and Shin (1998); Goldstein and Pauzner (2005); Morris and Shin
(2004).
2Several authors have estimated the role of information for the propensity for spec-
2Our speciﬁc application is the extreme turbulence in the yen–dollar market in
1998 caused by the unwinding of carry trades. The speciﬁc events triggering
this turbulence were unrelated to the Japanese market, such as the aftermath
of the Russian and LTCM crisis as well as yield curve adjustments in the run–
up to the adoption of the Euro. We use daily data from 1990 to 2004, enabling
us to include both time periods with and without turmoil. We estimate the
global game with the eﬃcient method of moments proposed by Gallant and
Tauchen (1996, 2002) and conﬁrm the key role of strategic behavior in the
econometric model.
We ﬁnd this currency market to be generally very deep, i.e. the game players
or strategic traders only rarely have a price impact and generate extra volatil-
ity. However, the estimated model also shows evidence of low information
disparities amongst strategic traders. Their orders tend to be similar and
generate market fragility, i.e. there are episodes of sharp changes in prices
with small changes in fundamentals.
Our empirical application links market illiquidity to investors’ (lack of) risk
appetite, itself is proxied by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE)
Volatility Index (VIX), a widely used barometer of investor sentiment and
market volatility. In this we are motivated by Cairns et al. (2007) and Brun-
nermeier et al. (2008) who ﬁnd that an increase in the VIX is associated with
the depreciation of currencies with high interest rates against currencies with
low interest rates, and hence with carry trade losses.
We ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of asymmetry between the buy and sell sides of
the market. Liquidity tensions on the sell side are much less frequent but
also much more sensitive to risk appetite. In particular, strategic agents only
have a positive price impact when the VIX is higher than 21%, while their
negative price impact shows up for VIX values exceeding 37%.
This asymmetry translates into strong escalator–elevator eﬀects in prices.
Strategic traders create both positive trends and sharp corrections in prices.
Their price impact component in returns has a positive mean, with strategic
traders buying more frequently than selling, but generating large negative
skewness, or tail risk.
Moreover, the estimated correlation between this component of returns and
the component driven by fundamentals is positive, which shows that strate-
gic traders amplify the movements in fundamentals. This is in line with the
ulative attacks using reduced form speciﬁcations motivated by global games, and ﬁnd
indirect empirical support for the theory. See inter alia Metz and Michaelis (2003), Prati
and Sbracia (2002) and Tillmann (2004). More recently, Chen et al. (2008) study strategic
complementarities with mutual fund data.
3empirical literature that shows that ﬁnancial crises are related to fundamen-
tals. See e.g. the papers cited in Chen et al. (2008) that relate failing banks
to bad fundamentals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We develop the global game
to model returns under liquidity tensions in Section 2. Then we construct
an econometric model of fundamentals and liquidity in Section 3. In Section
4, we apply our model to yen-dollar data that covers the market turmoil in
1998. Finally, we present our conclusions in Section 5. Proofs are relegated
to an appendix.
2 Returns under Liquidity Tensions
Consider a market for a ﬁnancial asset, with two categories of agents, strate-
gic agents and nonstrategic agents. The strategic agents trade for short term
speculative reasons, could be proprietary traders or hedge funds, and play a
coordination game. The nonstrategic agents are long–term investors provid-
ing residual demand/supply.
2.1 Return Decomposition
The strategic agents are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1] and each
agent makes a binary decision to buy or sell one unit of the asset. The
fraction of agents selling is λt ∈ [0,1].
The observed return on the asset during trading round t, rt, can be decom-
posed into two components:
Observed return (rt) = fundamental return (vt) + liquidity return (ℓt). (1)
The fundamental return vt is driven by asset fundamentals (the present value
of the asset’s expected future dividends) capturing the exogenous arrival of
information during the period. The fundamental return is assumed to be








The liquidity return ℓt represents the price impact of strategic agents
ℓt = c
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is a measure of the (lack of) liquidity
or market depth on the sell and buy side, respectively, driven by the willing-









is, the higher the price concession required by the nonstrate-
gic traders. In the absence of liquidity tensions, the situation expected most





Price changes can be expressed as
pt − pt−1 = rt = vt + ℓt, (3)
so that the current price pt is equal to some initial price p0 plus the accumu-
lation of fundamental and liquidity returns
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.
This representation of prices follows the notion of liquidity in Grossman and
Miller (1988), as well as Bernardo and Welch (2004), Morris and Shin (2004)
and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005).




t is zero, since such
models solely focus on a single direction impact, e.g. a decision to launch a
speculative attack or not. Given that our ultimate objective is to estimate
the model from time series data, we need to model both buying and selling
decisions as well as their price impacts.
2.2 Strategic Agents
The strategic agents are short–term speculators that care about the value of
their positions at the end of each trading round and expect to proﬁt during
liquidity tensions by exploiting a simple trading rule: Agent i buys if she









t means information available at the beginning of period, and sells
otherwise. The fundamental return, as well as the trading decisions of other
strategic agents, are not observed prior to trading.
3To simplify the expressions, we abstract from dividends and ﬁnancing costs, which are
relevant in carry trades. If we added these features then the relevant (excess) return for
the strategic trader would be (pt − pt−1)+dt, where dt is the corresponding asset income
minus the corresponding ﬁnancing cost.
5This trading decision rule captures the coordinated behavior of strategic
agents during periods of liquidity tensions. Given an expected vt, if agent i
expects a suﬃciently high λt she will sell, while buying if expecting a λt that
is low enough. Even if the price impact of an individual strategic agent is
negligible, they exert a signiﬁcant price impact if a suﬃcient number of them
make the same trading decision during times of illiquidity.4
The strategic agents only have access to incomplete information regarding





the parameters of the fundamental returns distribution (mt,αt). They do
not, however, observe vt itself, which in turn depends on the arrival of infor-
mation during the period, before their trading decision. Each strategic agent















where the signal noise εi
t is independently and identically distributed across
agents. The parameter βt is the signal precision which is known by all agents
and measures information disparities among strategic agents.
















t is the posterior mean of vt for this agent after observing xi
t.
2.3 Market Equilibrium
Consider monotone strategies where a strategic agent buys if her private
signal (given her private information Ωo
t) exceeds xo
t, and sells otherwise.
Applying a law of large numbers to the cross section of strategic agents, the
equilibrium fraction of agents selling is
λ
e





where xt represents the distribution of signals across agents. The following
Lemma characterizes λe
t.
4More detailed theoretical models can be found in Bernardo and Welch (2004) and
Morris and Shin (2004), who model sales coordination under strong liquidity tensions
and a random execution of orders. The former authors follow the spirit of bank-run
models, while the latter authors rely on loss limits. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005),
and Plantin and Shin (2007), show coordination in dynamic models without relying on a
random execution of orders. The former authors focus on predatory trading, while the
latter authors introduce funding externalities in the spirit of Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2007).
6Lemma 1 There is a unique equilibrium in the coordination game if and
only if
α2
t (αt + βt)





















t is the signal of the strategic agent that is indiﬀerent between buying
and selling.
Φ(·) and φ(·) are the cumulative distribution function and density of the
standard normal distribution, respectively. The proof and the characteriza-
tion of xo
t are shown in the Appendix. The uniqueness condition is a lower
bound on βt for given αt and price impacts. That is, a unique equilibrium
requires private information to be precise enough with respect to public in-
formation. Note that λe
t is monotonically decreasing in vt, providing a clear
connection between fundamentals and equilibrium. Moreover, the price im-
pact of strategic agents ampliﬁes the eﬀect of vt on rt since Lemma 1 implies








































While observed returns are decomposed into fundamental and liquidity re-
turns in (1), λe









in the deﬁnition of rt. To clarify this, con-
sider the special case where βt → ∞, i.e. the signal precision is unbounded
and hence there are small information disparities. In this case, the marginal
agent’s beliefs about λe
t converge to being uniform in [0,1] whatever distribu-
tion of the signals. Even though fundamental uncertainty becomes negligible
as βt → ∞, the marginal agent expects half of the agents to sell and conse-









. We arrive at the following corollary:















where I[·] denotes the indicator function.
7λe
t is not a continuous function of vt and hence we ﬁnd market fragility where








produce a sharp change in λe
t. In





t , then even a relatively high vt might not be enough to
avoid λe
t = 1. And vice versa, if liquidity tensions on the buy side are much




t then even a relatively low vt might not
be enough to avoid λe
t = 0.



























This simple expression of λe
t also helps in clarifying the diﬀerences and sim-
ilarities between our global game, where asymmetric information among the
strategic agents helps to pin down a unique equilibrium, and a coordination
game where vt is common knowledge. If fundamental returns are low enough,
i.e. vt < −c
+
t , then both our global game and the common knowledge game
give λe
t = 1. Similarly, if fundamental returns are high enough, i.e. vt > c
−
t ,
then both games give λe
t = 0.
The two outcomes only (may) diﬀer at intermediate values of the fundamental
returns. In that region, the global game pins down a unique λe
t depending








, while both λe
t = 0 or 1 are
possible outcomes in the common knowledge counterpart. Therefore, to take
the latter model to the data, we would need to deﬁne an ad–hoc equilibrium
selection procedure. Nevertheless, two standard reﬁnements of the common
knowledge equilibria coincide with the global game equilibrium in (9). The
risk–dominant equilibrium is known to coincide with the unique equilibrium
in a global game with unbounded signal’s precision. That is not necessarily
the case for the payoﬀ–dominant equilibrium, but it coincides with the global
game outcome in our model.
5The introduction of dividends and ﬁnancing costs only requires two changes in the
previous results. If dt denotes the asset income minus the corresponding ﬁnancing cost
then the corollary changes to λe
t = I
￿








. Regarding the lemma, we
should take into account dt in the deﬁnition of mo
t in the Appendix.
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It is unrealistic to expect those state variables to remain constant over time,
and for the purpose of estimation we need to model their dynamic evolution.
In this our approach is reminiscent of Foster and Viswanathan (1995) in their
empirical application of Kyle (1985).
3.1 Fundamental Returns
The distribution of fundamental returns is characterized in (2) by its mean
and precision (mt,αt). The fundamental mean can be linked to a predictor of
fundamentals that is observable by strategic agents before they take trading
decisions, i.e.
mt = m(ft)
for some function m(·). The choice of both ft and m(·) will depend on the
particular empirical application.
In addition, we need to model the volatility of fundamental returns. In
this we are guided by both stylized facts of ﬁnancial returns and theoretical
considerations. In particular, ﬁnancial returns are known to exhibit volatility
clusters and have fat tails. This of course does leave us with a broad range
of models, typically either of the the GARCH or stochastic volatility6 (SV)
type. Of those, the SV models are more natural, because of their tighter
connections with decision–making, see e.g Tauchen and Pitts (1983).
Following a standard SV model, the fundamental return precision α
−1
t is a
stationary AR(1) process in logs with normal innovations:
−lnαt − γ1 = γ2(−lnαt−1 − γ1) + γ3ut, ut
iid ∼ N (0,1), |γ2| < 1, (10)
where ut and the Gaussian innovation of vt are independent to be consistent
with the assumed information structure in trading decisions. This speciﬁca-
tion nests cases such as a deterministic αt with γ3 = 0 or lack of persistence
in αt with γ2 = 0.
6Proposed originally by Clark (1973) and Taylor (1986).
93.2 Private Signals
Another relevant dimension of fundamental returns is the extent to which
they are revealed to the strategic agents though the signal distribution (5)
with the precision βt. A consequence of (7) in Lemma 1 is that the uniqueness
condition needs to be satisﬁed in each period with liquidity tensions in the








change over time. Therefore,
the stochastic process of βt could be expressed as
βt = β (bt)
for some function β (·) that satisﬁes the lower bound denoted by bt. A simple
example of such a function is:
βt = bt + η, (11)








This parameter is a measure of the relative precision of strategic agents’
private information about fundamentals at the end of period with respect
to their public information. If η is very low we ﬁnd the lowest level of
private signals’ precision that is compatible with the uniqueness condition
(7). If η is very high then private information is much more reliable than
public information and signals are so precise about vt that there are low
information disparities across agents. The higher its value the closer we are
to the equilibrium described in Corollary 2.
3.3 Market (Il)liquidity









Several measures of liquidity have been proposed, e.g. Dan´ ıelsson and Payne
(2002), Amihud et al. (2005) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), some of
which depend on proprietary data. The speciﬁc market structure dictates the
speciﬁc modelling of price impacts and choice of explanatory variables. For
example, if the underlying market structure is composed by market makers
as on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), it would be natural to use
tick–by–tick observations from that exchange, the so–called Trade and Quote
(TAQ) data.








to a proxy of the willingness
of nonstrategic agents to absorb the orders from strategic agents. Such a
10willingness, or risk appetite, depends on their risk aversion and risk itself.7
Of the various publicly available measures of (inverse) risk appetite, the
Chicago Board of Exchange volatility index (VIX) may be the most widely
used one in practice, and what we use here.








for some functions c+ (·) and c− (·). In addition, to take this model to the
data, we need a speciﬁc functional form. This function should be such that
there are no liquidity tensions when σt is low and, when σt is high, liquidity
tensions are present and increasing along with σt.
A natural speciﬁcation is a linear speciﬁcation capturing both the presence
and magnitude of liquidity tensions as a function of σt, separately for each


























2 measure the sensitivity of market








2 deﬁne σt thresholds
for the presence of liquidity tensions.
4 Empirical Application
The relevance of our methodology ultimately rests on its ability to capture
important tumultuous events in ﬁnancial markets. Our empirical application
is based on a particular scenario of market instability driven by carry trades.
One of the best known examples of a carry trade induced market turmoil
occurred in 1998, when over two days in October — 7th and 8th — the dollar
fell from 131 yen to 112 yen by lunchtime in London on Thursday the 8th,
bouncing back sharply to end New York trading at 119 yen. October 7th and
8th 1998 were two of the most turbulent days of currency trading in ﬁnancial
markets. These events are discussed e.g. by Morris and Shin (2000) and
Dan´ ıelsson and Shin (2003). In the week beginning October 5th, the decline
of the dollar against the yen accelerated sharply — closing down roughly
15% over the week consistent with the rapid unwinding of the yen carry
trades. Global events such as the Russian default, LTCM, and the yield
7The connection of liquidity and risk has a long tradition in ﬁnance, see e.g. Benston
and Hagerman (1974).
11curve adjustments leading to the Euro initiated the unwinding of previous
long positions in dollars.
We use daily yen–dollar exchange rates as reported by the New York Fed
and estimate the model using continuously compounded returns in percent-
age terms as rt from (3). While our main event of interest occurs in 1998,
the entire data sample used for estimation spans 1990 to 2004. Since our
model addresses both liquid and illiquid time periods, the data set needs to
be suﬃciently long so that we obtain a good estimation of the underlying
processes of fundamental and liquidity returns. At the same time we avoid
an arbitrary choice of the time period to be ﬁtted by the model. We show
the exchange rates in levels and continuously compounded returns in Figures
1 and 2 respectively, whilst descriptive statistics of the returns can be found
in Table 1.
Figure 1 shows clear escalator–elevator eﬀects in 1998 characteristic of carry
trade induced ﬁnancial turmoil. This is visible in the returns in Figure 2 as a
particularly pronounced volatility cluster. Furthermore, this translates into
the negative skewness in returns shown in Table 1.
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Figure 2: Yen–Dollar returns 1990–2004






12Figure 3: Interest rate spread 1990–2004






Figure 4: VIX 1990–2004





The fundamental mean mt is driven by the interest rate spread between
the US and Japan, since it can be interpreted as the dividend of holding
dollars against yen.8 Indicate iJAP and iUS as the daily rate of the monthly9
London interbank oﬀered rate (LIBOR) in yens and dollars, respectively.
This data was obtained directly from www.bba.org. The interest rate spread










and the fundamental mean
mt is equal to that spread measured on a daily basis (divided by 250). In this
way, we follow the spirit of the uncovered interest rate parity10 in the sense
of an expected (fundamental) dollar appreciation, mt > 0, when iJAP
t−1 > iUS
t−1.
We show the spread in Figure 3, and its descriptive statistics in Table 1. This
series is quite persistent and, during most part of the sample period, the yen
8Other macro variables such as real output and nominal money supply are not available
at the daily frequency.
9We should use overnight rates but the corresponding time series starts in 2001. Fortu-
nately, the behavior of overnight rates is closely related to monthly rates. For the period
of time were both are available, the correlation is 0.975 and OLS of overnight rates onto
one-month rates gives an intercept of −0.001 and a slope of 0.964.
10In spite of its theoretical appealing, it is well known that the uncovered interest rate
parity is at odds with empirical evidence. See for instance Evans and Lyons (2002).
13Table 1: Data summary statistics 1990–2004
FX return is the daily continuously compounded return of the yen/dollar exchange as
in Figure 2. Spread is the annualized log–interest rate diﬀerential between the yen and
the dollar as in Figure 3. VIX is the annualized option implied volatility index from the
CBOE as in Figure 4. All variables in %.
mean s.d. skewness kurtosis min max
FX return -0.009 0.704 -0.501 3.954 -5.630 3.240
Spread -2.576 2.368 0.183 -1.309 -6.369 2.152
VIX 19.93 6.352 0.910 0.742 9.31 45.74
interest rate is lower than the dollar interest rate.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the VIX index while Table 1 shows the cor-
responding descriptive statistics. We can see that the VIX peaks at ﬁnancial
turmoils such as the Russian default of August 1998, the terrorist attacks
of September 2001, and the WorldCom accounting scandal and bankruptcy
plus other factors (including geopolitical tensions) in June–July 2002.
4.1 Model Estimation
Due to the nonlinear dependence on non-normal dynamic latent variables
our model cannot be directly estimated by either maximum likelihood or
the generalized method of moments. However, simulation methods have
successfully been applied to SV models and we follow that approach here, in
particular the eﬃcient method of moments (EMM) proposed by Gallant and
Tauchen (1996, 2002).
The EMM approach is based on ﬁrst estimating an auxiliary model whose
purpose is to provide optimal moments conditions. We then simulate the
theoretical model for given parameter values and minimize the distance be-
tween the moments from the simulated data and the observed data. Given
the large number of local minima characteristic of such estimation, we follow
the Markov chain Monte Carlo procedure of Chernozhukov and Hong (2003).
The auxiliary model provides a score generator by using a semi nonparamet-
ric (SNP) method as described e.g. in Gallant and Tauchen (2006). The
SNP density is based on the notion that a Hermite expansion can be used
to provide a general purpose approximation of the density function of the
14data of interest, with a parametric model capturing dependence in the ﬁrst
and second moments. In our case we get an AR(1)–GARCH(1,1) model with
a semi-parametric density for innovations based on a fourth order Hermite
polynomial.11 This translates into 14 auxiliary parameters.
We can expect EMM to be nearly fully eﬃcient (like the maximum likeli-
hood estimator) when SNP is used as the score generator since it is a ﬂexi-
ble reduced form model that closely approximates the actual distribution of
the data. This implementation of the EMM procedure selects the optimal
testable properties of the model. Therefore, the value of the criterion func-
tion provides a good test of the adequacy of a theoretical model regarding
the dynamic and steady state properties of data.
We initially estimated η in (11) along with the other model parameters,
i.e. we estimated the return model in (8). However the results indicated
unbounded signals precision (βt → ∞) in the sense that η was so high that
λe
t in Lemma 1 was actually equivalent to λe
t in Corollary 2. This means low
information disparities across strategic agents, which is a natural feature of
FX markets. In particular, the estimated ˆ η was 3484 and implied a process βt
with a similar average, while the estimated process αt had an average lower
than 5, i.e. we found βt >> αt. The corresponding process λe
t was outside
the interval [0.001,0.999] more than 90% of the time.
Consequently, the estimates in the remainder of this section refer to model
(9), where we impose βt → ∞. This model can equivalently be derived from
two standard reﬁnements in the corresponding common knowledge game (the











can be found in Table 2. The model is not rejected,
with the data ﬁt very good. The criterion function is 8.95, with an associated
p–value of 25.6%, and all parameters signiﬁcant at the 5% level except φ
+
1 .
The SV component of fundamental returns shows an average level of ˆ γ1 =
−1.32 in logs, persistence ˆ γ2 = 0.34 and volatility of volatility ˆ γ3 = 0.66. The
main liquidity components on the buy side are ˆ φ
+
1 = −0.04 and ˆ φ
+
2 = 0.23,
while the sell estimates are ˆ φ
−
1 = −9.34 and ˆ φ
−
2 = 3.45. We ﬁnd that high
VIX, as a proxy for nonstrategic agents’ lack of risk appetite, is related to
low liquidity for the yen carry trades.








2 = 2.707. That
is, illiquidity tensions on the sell side c
−
t are much less frequent but also
much more sensitive to risk appetite. Since the estimates with VIX use it in
11Speciﬁcally, SNP models are described by 8 digits and our selected model is 11114010.
The ﬁrst four digits describe the AR-GARCH structure, while the remaining four digits
describe the Hermite polynomial. See Gallant and Tauchen (2006) for additional details.
15Table 2: Estimation results
The process α
−1








are deﬁned in (12). The
standard errors are shown in parenthesis under each estimate. The number of simulated
returns is 100,000.

















-1.315 0.336 0.655 -0.035 0.229 -9.338 3.449
(0.111) (0.116) (0.035) (0.081) (0.051) (0.322) (0.128)
standardized terms, the results imply that liquidity tensions are present on
the buy side when the VIX exceeds 20.9% and 37.1% on the sell side. Both
sides of the market are usually inﬁnitely deep, i.e. strategic agents aﬀect the
market only rarely, 1.6% of the time on the sell side, and 38.3% of the time
on the buy side.




t above thresholds of in-
creasing size as multiples of the volatility of the yen–dollar exchange rate
returns. The asymmetry between the buy and sell sides is clear, c
+
t is char-
acterized by a high frequency of low values while c
−
t is characterized by a low
frequency of high values. This is consistent with the up by escalator–down
by elevator scenario.
For comparison, we also estimated a descriptive statistical model with stochas-
tic volatility and leverage eﬀect (LSV), i.e. with correlations between shocks
to returns and shocks to volatility. This eﬀect can be interpreted as a descrip-
tive modelling of asymmetric tail events, as opposed to our explicit liquidity
mechanism. For instance, Gagnon and Chaboud (2007) report high actual
and implied volatility around the sharp yen appreciation in October 1998.






, where both mt
and αt follow the same processes as in our model, except for the correlation
between shocks to rt and shocks to −lnαt. The correlation estimate is −0.14
to approximate the up by escalator–down by elevator features in the data.
The estimates of the counterparts of (γ1,γ2,γ3) are (−1.02,0.64,0.58). The
presence of liquidity tensions decreases the level and persistence of stochastic
volatility with respect to the LSV model.
The criterion function is 12.76, with an associated p–value of 23.7%. That is,
16Table 3: Asymmetry in market illiquidity
Relative frequency and average magnitude of price impacts above thresholds of increasing











magnitude frequency(%) mean frequency(%) mean
0 × σFX 1.61 1.77 38.28 0.20
1 × σFX 1.26 2.18 0.70 0.78
2 × σFX 0.81 2.81 0 —
3 × σFX 0.59 3.18 0 —
4 × σFX 0.35 3.70 0 —
5 × σFX 0.19 4.10 0 —
our model does not perform worse than a LSV.12 The data ﬁt of our model
is slightly better, but the criterion function p–values are similar because our
model relies on more parameters.
4.2 Model Properties
We further illustrate the estimation results by means of simulations.13 We
simulate the fundamental return precision αt from (10) and compute the
fundamental return mean mt from interest rates. Given those two processes,
we simulate the fundamental return vt from (2). Finally, we simulate the










First, we explore the impact of coordination and liquidity in returns by com-
paring the diﬀerent statistical properties of total returns and their funda-
mental and liquidity components. Table 4 shows some sample statistics for
the observed and simulated data.
The model parameters were estimated by using the optimal moments selected
by the EMM procedure. Given the low EMM criterion function, it is not
12Without a leverage eﬀect, the SV model is rejected by the data. A simple stochastic
volatility model is not suitable to explain the yen–dollar exchange rate.
13All the computations in this section refer to simulations of 30 times the sample size,
which means more than 100,000 simulated returns.
17Table 4: Static properties
Mean, standard deviation, coeﬃcient of skewness, and coeﬃcient of excess kurtosis of
observed returns and simulated returns under estimates in Table 2. Simulated returns are
decomposed as in (1).
mean s.d. skewness kurtosis
data -0.009 0.704 -0.501 3.954
rt 0.007 0.680 -0.738 4.861
vt -0.010 0.585 -0.001 1.788
ℓt 0.018 0.291 -9.444 116.6
surprising that the four statistics of the simulated data are close to the actual
data. Ultimately this supports the conclusion that our model has successfully
captured the stylized statistical facts of the yen–dollar exchange rate.
In addition, we can compare those four moments across the diﬀerent compo-
nents of asset returns. The liquidity component adds a positive mean but a
quite negative skewness, or tail risk, to fundamental returns. In fact, we ﬁnd
λe
t = 1 in 44% of periods with liquidity tensions, i.e. strategic traders sell
less than half the time they have a signiﬁcant price impact. Similarly, this
component has a low volatility but an extremely high kurtosis compared to
fundamental returns.
The theoretical model shows that ceteris paribus liquidity returns amplify








varies over time as vt
does. We can quantify the comovement between fundamental and liquidity
returns by their time series correlation, which is 11% in our estimated model.
Similarly, the correlation between fundamental returns and λe
t itself is -74%.
he global game, and equivalently the risk–dominant and payoﬀ–dominant
equilibrium of the corresponding common knowledge game, induce a strong
negative correlation between sales and fundamental returns.
We can also study the dynamic properties of the data, in particular the
autocorrelation in levels and squares, presented in Table 5. The observed
returns exhibit low, but not zero autocorrelation, similar to our model. Note
that this is the result of the interaction between a high autocorrelation in
liquidity returns and the lack of autocorrelation in fundamental returns.
Our model also captures the higher autocorrelation in the squared returns
which is driven again by the interaction of fundamental and liquidity returns.
18Table 5: Dynamic properties
Autocorrelations of observed returns and simulated returns under estimates in Table 2.
Autocorrelations are computed for the ﬁrst ﬁve lags, ﬁrst for the returns and then for
squared returns.
lags 1 2 3 4 5
returns 0.025 0.013 -0.043 0.015 0.007
rt 0.096 0.051 0.046 0.037 0.021
vt 0.002 0.000 0.004 -0.003 0.000
ℓt 0.529 0.274 0.224 0.212 0.105
squared
returns 0.211 0.119 0.102 0.069 0.097
rt 0.348 0.191 0.206 0.196 0.132
vt 0.039 0.014 0.005 0.003 0.001
ℓt 0.503 0.237 0.269 0.262 0.164
The former show autocorrelation much lower than the data, while the latter
show autocorrelation much higher than the data.
A detailed analysis of the escalator–elevator eﬀect is presented in Table 6,
which shows the frequency of returns higher than their mean plus a multiple
of their standard deviation, and returns lower than their mean minus a mul-
tiple of their standard deviation. The asymmetry in tail events in the data
is clear, with a higher frequency of strong dollar depreciations vs. strong
appreciations. This asymmetry is well captured by the coordination model,
in particular the liquidity returns.
We further illustrate the properties of the model by plotting typical sample
paths from the simulations, over 2,000 days. Figures 5(a) and 5(b) show the
time series of the two return components, fundamental and liquidity returns,
while their sum is shown in Figure 5(c), and the cumulative returns or prices
(with an initial price of 1) in Figure 5(d).
Notice the diﬀerent behavior of both return components. The impact of
strategic traders is given by the liquidity returns. They are zero for long
periods of time but become positive and low for a part of the time, and very
negative for a small number of periods. This means we can see a dramatic
escalator–elevator episode, or the realization of tail risk, in the prices of Fig-
19Table 6: Escalator–elevator eﬀect in returns
Frequency in % of returns higher than their mean plus a multiple of their standard
deviation (+ row), and lower than their mean minus a multiple of their standard deviation
(- row). Each column refers to a diﬀerent multiple. Computations under the estimates in
Table 2.
0 1 2 3 4 5
data + 50.24 12.15 2.10 0.43 0.13 0.00
- 49.76 11.94 3.18 0.99 0.32 0.08
rt + 51.36 12.64 1.99 0.33 0.06 0.00
- 48.64 11.85 2.52 0.86 0.45 0.24
vt + 50.06 13.45 2.64 0.54 0.11 0.02
- 49.94 13.41 2.66 0.52 0.11 0.02
ℓt + 20.00 4.99 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00
- 80.00 1.13 1.08 0.98 0.87 0.75
ure 5(d). Strategic traders create both positive trends and sharp corrections
in prices.
4.3 Robustness of Results
The model shows a good data ﬁt but it remains to be demonstrated whether
the empirical results are driven by the strategic behavior of agents, or sim-
ply the additional econometric structure of fundamentals and liquidity. To
investigate this, we study some alternative proxies and speciﬁcations.14
The use of the interest rate diﬀerential and stochastic volatility with funda-
mental returns seems plausible and general enough. Therefore our robustness
checks will focus on market illiquidity. The empirical evidence below suggests
that our estimation results are driven jointly by the economic and statistical
structure of the model, with the strategic component of the model essential.
First, σt can be changed. As an alternative proxy of global volatility in
ﬁnancial markets, we used a volatility forecast from the Morgan Stanley
Capital International (MSCI) index. We found similar parameter estimates
and model properties in general. This is not surprising because the correla-











































(d) Simulated prices p
Figure 5: Simulated outcomes
21tion between the new proxy and the VIX is around 0.4. In particular, the
estimated γ2 is slightly higher and closer to its estimate in the LSV model,
due to the the autocorrelation in the new proxy being lower than in the VIX.
Second, we can study diﬀerent speciﬁcations of market illiquidity as a func-
tion of σt. We do not look for the best speciﬁcation in terms of data ﬁtting,
but simply study one alternative speciﬁcation where there is not a clear cut
distinction between liquid and illiquid periods. That is, strategic traders























We found that our results did not depend on separating liquid vs. illiquid
times, or the linear speciﬁcation itself, with a similar data ﬁt and model
properties as before. For instance, the escalator–elevator eﬀect holds with
ˆ φ
+
1 less negative than ˆ φ
−
1 and ˆ φ
+
2 less positive than ˆ φ
−









and the corresponding liquidity returns have similar
properties in this new model, being negligible for long periods of time.
Finally, we found an unbounded precision of private signals or low informa-
tion disparities across strategic agents, which we considered a natural feature
of FX markets. Moreover, even if we think of a common knowledge set–up
and hence a situation of multiple equilibria, both the risk–dominant and
payoﬀ–dominant equilibria coincide with the (unbounded precision) global
game equilibrium. Therefore, even in a common knowledge set–up, the model
estimated in Table 2 represents the relevant equilibrium of our coordination
game.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to compare the quantitative implications of this
equilibrium to some other ad–hoc equilibrium. Given the estimates of Table
2, fundamental returns fall into the multiple equilibria region around 84% of
the periods with liquidity tensions. We chose a simple ad–hoc equilibrium
where the strategic agents aggregate behavior is like a coin toss in the multiple
equilibria region, i.e. we randomize λe
t = 0 or 1 with probability 0.5 in that
region. Note that this represents an extra source of randomness in the game
outcome.
The parameter estimates and the corresponding model properties change
in the expected direction. Now liquidity returns absorb part of the role of
fundamental returns in generating volatility clustering, and hence we ﬁnd
a lower ˆ γ2 with respect to the global game. At the same time, liquidity

















being less extreme. That is, the tail risk
is a bit less pronounced in the new game. But in general, the quantitate
implications for observed returns are similar to the global game, in fact the
data ﬁt is similar.
The main diﬀerence between both games is how they decompose similar total
return properties into diﬀerent fundamental and liquidity returns. They are
close to being uncorrelated in the ad–hoc equilibrium, with a correlation of
2%. Given the new estimated parameters, fundamental returns fall into the
multiple equilibria region 78% of the time, when liquidity tensions and out-
comes are random and hence unrelated to fundamental returns. Similarly, we
can translate the main diﬀerence between both equilibria to the correlation
between fundamental returns and λe
t itself. The estimated correlation is -9%,
much lower in absolute value than in the global game.
The properties of fundamental and liquidity returns in the global game are
closer to the empirical literature that shows that ﬁnancial crises are related
to fundamentals. To test if the global game correlation between λe
t and
fundamental returns is plausible we would need data on traders’ actions, i.e.
quantity or order data. At the daily frequency it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd public
quantity data in currency markets, and even when they are available at lower
frequencies they may not be reliable enough.15
5 Conclusions and Further Research
This paper represents a ﬁrst attempt to the integration of global games and
empirical ﬁnance. Using the eﬃcient method of moments and only publicly
available data, we showed that a simple coordination model ﬁts well a long
span of daily data that covers the yen-dollar carry trade turmoil in 1998. The
empirical results are robust, both in terms of proxies and especially speciﬁ-
cations. Our robustness checks indicate that what we are really capturing is
the strategic behavior, and we are convinced that the results are not simply
due to the econometric structure of fundamentals and liquidity.
In particular, we found the yen–dollar market to be generally very deep but
also subject to clear up by the escalator–down by the elevator episodes. The
15For instance, at the quarterly frequency, Brunnermeier et al. (2008) run some regres-
sions to explore the impact of carry trades and use non-commercial futures positions to
proxy speculative positions. This proxy is quite noisy and hence the authors ﬁnd diﬃcult
to obtain signiﬁcant results with it. This is not surprising because the non-commercial
classiﬁcation may be imperfect to detect speculative positions and moreover the important
OTC positions are outside this proxy.
23asymmetry between positive trends and sharp corrections in prices is due to
liquidity tensions on the sell side being much less frequent but also much
more sensitive to risk appetite. The market fragility itself is due to low
information disparities amongst the game players.
On the other hand there are some interesting issues that are outside the
scope of this paper and hence are left for future research. We could apply
our methodology to the estimation of new models that enrich the information
structure and the dynamic behavior of strategic agents. The informational
content of prices in global games has recently been studied by Angeletos
and Werning (2006), Hellwig et al. (2006), and Tarashev (2003). Similarly,
richer dynamic behavior in global games, e.g. learning across several trading
rounds, is considered by Angeletos et al. (2007), and Dasgupta (2007). Abreu
and Brunnermeier (2003) and specially Plantin and Shin (2007) are other
relevant references on dynamic behavior, close in spirit to global games.16
Furthermore, our focus has been on market risk but credit risk is another
relevant application of coordination games, and hence another area where we
could apply our methodology. In particular, Ordonez (2008) develops a (non-
standard) dynamic global game that delivers clustering in risk-taking without
a big change in fundamentals. His theoretical results are consistent with the
descriptive empirical evidence in Das et al. (2007), where fundamentals do
not seem enough to explain default clustering.
A Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is developed in two stages. The ﬁrst stage shows that the condition
in Lemma 1 is a suﬃcient and necessary condition for a unique symmetric
equilibrium. The second stage shows that the corresponding switching strat-
egy is the only one that survives iterated dominance, i.e. there cannot be
any other equilibrium when the symmetric one exists.
Given the previous set-up, it is natural to focus on monotone strategies. Let
us focus also on a symmetric equilibrium where all agents sell if xt < xo
t.
By means of studying the marginal strategic agent, we can compute the
Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this imperfect information game in a similar way
to Morris and Shin (1998). The marginal agents’s signal must be such that
E (rt | Ωo
t) = 0, or equivalently

















16The predatory trading model in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), which represents a
diﬀerent type of coordination, could be another interesting application of our methodology.
24where we have assumed a law of large numbers can be applied to the cross
section of signals given vt.
The above expressions require the updated beliefs of strategic agent o after
observing her signal, regarding both the fundamental asset return and her
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and then we ﬁnd that a suﬃcient condition for a unique mo
t is that the slope
of the right hand side is lower than one everywhere, i.e.
α2
t (αt + βt)










This condition is also necessary in the sense that if it does not hold then we
can choose an mt such that there will be multiple mo
t solving the previous
equality.
To sum up, if that inequality is satisﬁed then we know that there is a unique
equilibrium such that every strategic agent buys the asset if and only if her
signal is such that xt < xo
t, where xo
t is given by xo
t = β
−1
t [(αt + βt)mo
t − αtmt]
with mo
t solving the previous ﬁxed point equation.
The second stage of the proof follows a standard argument in the global
games literature and hence we will brieﬂy summarize it. We deﬁne ut(˜ m, ˆ m)
as the expected utility of a strategic agent that observes a signal such that
her posterior mean about vt is ˜ m and thinks that the rest of strategic agents
sell if they observe a signal that implies a posterior mean lower than ˆ m, i.e.
















((αt + βt) ˆ m − βt ˜ m − αtmt)
￿
.
25We can show that ut(˜ m, ˆ m) is increasing in ˜ m and decreasing in ˆ m. This
feature allows the construction of a sequence of increasing values of m and
another of decreasing values of m that imply the deletion of many strategies
by iterated dominance arguments. Both sequences converge to the solution
of ut(mo
t,mo
t) = 0, which is exactly the unique symmetric equilibrium that
we constructed before. That is the only strategy that survives iterated dom-
inance.
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